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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019  
TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PREL](#) [IR](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [IT](#)  
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO ITALY ON COORDINATE MEASURING MACHINE  
EXPORTS TO MAPNA

REF: A. 09ROME83  
[1](#)B. 09STATE8305  
[1](#)C. 09ROME178  
[1](#)D. 09ROME347  
[1](#)E. 09STATE38773  
[1](#)F. 09ROME511  
[1](#)G. CURRAN/ MEYERS EMAIL JUNE 26  
[1](#)H. 2009

Classified By: EUR/PRA Act Dir Kathleen Morenski,  
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.

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OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST  
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[1](#)2. (C) Washington requests Post deliver the non-paper in paragraph 3 to appropriate host government officials in the foreign affairs ministry in response to the action request in REF G. Post should pursue the following objectives:

-- Thank Italy for our ongoing nonproliferation coordination and the information (REF G) provided on its export application for coordinate measuring machines to Iran.

-- Inform the GOI that we have analyzed the documentation provided by Italy (REF G) and urge Italy to deny the license application based on our analysis of the classification of the machines and previous NSG denials to the end user.

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NONPAPER  
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[1](#)3. (C) BEGIN NONPAPER FOR ITALY

-- Thank you for the information on the application to export three coordinate measuring machines (CMMs) to Iran.

-- Based on our review of the provided information and supplier (Brown & Sharpe) catalog information two of the CMMs, model Global Advantage 07.10.07, achieve a maximum permissible error of indication (MPE of 1.5 L/333 microns) that makes them controlled by both the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

-- We encourage Italy to carefully review the technical specifications again, as we believe that these items meet NSG and WA parameters.

-- Our analysis is that this model is controlled by entries 2B006 and 2B206 of the EU export control list.

-- We note that, pursuant to UNSCR 1737, Italy is obligated to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory of such NSG-controlled goods to Iran as an end user.

-- The third model, a Browne & Sharpe model Global Advantage 20.33.15, does not appear to achieve sufficient accuracy that would necessitate control under the WA or NSG. However, it could still be used to accurately measure parts for centrifuge or nuclear weapons components.

-- Also pursuant to UNSCR 1737, Italy is obligated to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of any item ) regardless of whether it is controlled by the NSG ) if they determine that the item would contribute to sensitive nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water related activities.

-- Thus, we strongly urge Italy to deny export permission of all three CMMs due to the risk of diversion in supporting UNSCR-proscribed nuclear program activities.

-- In this regard, we would like to note that Mapna Turbine Blade Engineering and Manufacturing in Iran has had a total of 20 denials (5 Dual-Use List denials and 15 complementary information catch-all denials) reported by Participating Governments in the NSG, which reflect a strong concern over the potential for diversion from Mapna.

-- We refer you to the following NSG denial numbers, involving mostly machine tools and related component manufacturing equipment and materials: DE-07-004, DE-07-006, DE-07-013, DE-09-001, DE-09-004, SE-07-006, GB-09-001, GB-09-002, GB-09-005, GB-09-006, GB-09-010, GB-08-028, GB-08-030, GB-08-041, GB-08-042, GB-08-045, GB-08-046, GB-08-047, NL-08-015 and IT-08-002.

-- We note that the previous complementary denial by Italy, IT-08-002, to Mapna was stated to be for "spare parts for tri-dimensional measure machines," citing Iran sanctions EC Regulation No. 1334/2000.

-- Again, we strongly urge denial of all three CMMs due to the risk of diversion in supporting UNSCR-proscribed nuclear program activities.

-- We underscore our continuing concern that Iran will make use of all of its national industries to obtain items and materials in support of its proscribed nuclear activities.

-- We continue to urge the utmost vigilance in monitoring all such trade with Iran.

-- Our technical experts are available to discuss this further, as well other Iran- related export control issues.

END NON-PAPER

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REPORTING DEADLINE  
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14. (U) Post should report results within seven business days of receipt of this cable. Please slug replies for ISN, T, EUR, and NEA. Please use the caption SIPDIS in all replies.

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POINT OF CONTACT  
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15. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is ISN/CPI Lisa Meyers, 202-736-7939, meyersla@state.gov.

16. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.  
CLINTON